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Introduction 
T   T M  D R earned economics 
the nickname the dismal science. In An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), 
Malthus argued that population growth inevitably outstrips the growth of food pro­
duction, so eventually population becomes too great for food supply. In The Principles 
of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), Ricardo expanded this argument to the “iron 
law of wages.” At wages above the subsistence level, population grows, driving down 
wages. At wages below the subsistence level, the poor face starvation, population de­
clines, and wages rise. Poverty policies that transfer money to the poor must be in­
effective in the long run because wages must always end up at the subsistence level. 
Writing less than a century later, Alfred Marshall was much more optimistic. He 
believed it was possible to eliminate poverty, if not within a generation, at least within 
two generations.1 Marshall thought poverty policy consisted of increasing the demand 
for labor and reducing the supply of unskilled labor. He argued that economic growth 
increased the demand for labor. Increased education would lower the supply of un­
skilled labor, both directly, by moving workers from the unskilled to the skilled labor 
force, and indirectly, by reducing population growth. To further reduce the size of the 
unskilled labor force, society should encourage later marriages and childbearing among 
the “lower strains.” Finally, government should address the environment in which the 
poor lived. Marshall commented on the benefits of the suburbs, “where excellent sys­
tems of drainage, water supply and lighting, together with good schools and oppor­
tunities for open air play, give conditions at least as conducive to vigour as are to be 
found in the country,” and continued, “There is no better use for public and private 
money than in providing public parks and playgrounds in large cities, in contracting 
with railways to increase the number of workmen’s trains run by them, and in helping 
1. Alfred Marshall, “Three Lectures on Progress and Prosperity,” 1883; reprinted in Journal of 
Law and Economics 12 (April 1969): 184–212. 
1 those of the working classes who are willing to leave the large towns to do so, and to 
take their industries with them.”2 Marshall saw little role for redistribution of income 
to the poor. Giving the poor money would reduce their industriousness. Only the vic­
tims of misfortune were good candidates for such charity. 
In sharp contrast, Henry George, in Progress and Poverty (1879), maintained that 
because land was fixed in supply and necessary for production, only landowners would 
benefit from progress. According to George, the solution was to raise taxes on land (not 
on structures or other improvements) in proportion to their value. In this way, the ben­
efits from the increased value of land could be shared with workers. 
1. The Content of This Book 
From the vantage point of another century of experience, it is clear that Marshall’s op­
timism was in part justified and in part exaggerated. Standards of living are much higher 
than they were in the late nineteenth century. On the other hand, poverty did not dis­
appear in two generations. In large part, this is because our understanding of what it 
means to be poor has changed over time. Much of chapter 2 is devoted to exploring 
this issue. 
But the issue is not only that we have redefined who is poor. Using a constant def­
inition of poverty, over the past three decades there has been little change in the pro­
portion of Americans who are poor, despite dramatic increases in average incomes. 
Thus the Marshall-George debate remains relevant. Has the relation between economic 
growth and poverty broken down? Did some other trend hide the positive effects of 
economic growth? Or is the problem the way we measure poverty? Chapters 3 and 4 
address these issues. 
Many of Marshall’s concerns remain relevant today. As chapter 4 shows, there is a 
strong relation between poverty and the state of the labor market for low-wage work­
ers. Chapter 5 addresses the effectiveness of different policies designed to raise after-tax 
wages for low-wage workers. Some of these policies follow in the Marshallian tradition 
of increasing skills and demand for low-wage workers. Others have a somewhat more 
Georgist flavor (although certainly not based on taxing land), using the tax system to 
support low-wage workers or intervening directly in the wage-setting process. 
We also see renewed focus on the family and on increasing the age of mothers at 
first childbirth. Chapter 6 addresses issues such as out-of-wedlock births and teenage 
childbearing. It looks at policies designed to help children. As discussed earlier, Mar­
shall also believed that poverty was closely related to place. He advocated getting the 
poor out of crowded cities. Today, many analysts believe that concentrated poverty is a 
particular problem. Chapter 7 addresses the issues associated with such poverty and 
programs designed to alleviate it. 
Since Marshall’s time, the availability of public schooling has increased dramati­
cally. Not only public primary schooling but public secondary schooling is universally 
2. Marshall, 199–200. 
Chapter 1  2 available in the United States. Yet the effectiveness of public education, particularly in 
high-poverty areas, is hotly debated in this country. Chapter 8 discusses the debate over 
education reform. 
Finally, the concern that programs that support the poor will “sap their indus­
triousness” has been a recurring theme over the centuries of poverty policy. The 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, more commonly 
known as welfare reform, was a response to concerns that welfare was hurting the very 
people it was designed to help, very much as Marshall believed that the Poor Laws 
passed in the late eighteenth century in England had hurt laborers by encouraging 
them to rely on support for the poor. It is still somewhat early to assess the impact of 
welfare reform, but chapter 9 discusses the background of reform and what we know 
about its effects. 
Although most of this book is about poverty, the last third is about discrimination, 
and of that last third, three of the four chapters focus on race discrimination while the 
last is concerned with sex discrimination. There are two reasons for combining discus­
sions of poverty and discrimination in a single book. The first is that the methods re­
searchers use to study the two topics are closely related. Discrimination research relies 
on a combination of theory, observational studies, and experimental methods similar 
to those used in poverty research (discussed later). Although discrimination research 
relies more heavily on theory and less heavily on actual or quasi-experiments than does 
poverty research, it is easy to make the transition from the latter to the former. For the 
most part, those of you reading this book do not need a new set of analytical tools. In­
deed, when we discuss sex discrimination, we will return to some of the same theories 
that we will have discussed when analyzing the relation between the decline of marriage 
and poverty. 
The second reason for discussing poverty and discrimination in the same book is 
that, although the topics are distinct, they are also related. Most of the poor are not 
black, but the poverty rate is much higher among black Americans than among white 
Americans. To the extent that discrimination contributes to lower incomes among 
blacks, it contributes to poverty and helps to account for their higher poverty rate. 
But it is also likely that higher poverty rates among blacks contribute to discrim­
ination. Chapter 10 discusses a variety of theories of discrimination. Most rest on per­
ceived or actual differences (or both) between blacks and whites. If blacks tend to come 
from more disadvantaged backgrounds than do whites, this can affect the flow of in­
formation from potential employees to potential employers and can, through multiple 
mechanisms, reduce the employment prospects of blacks relative to whites, even whites 
from the same background. 
On the other hand, these differences could promote prejudice, but in many set­
tings people are unable to act on their prejudice. Therefore, the existence of prejudice 
need not lead to worse outcomes for blacks than for otherwise equivalent whites. 
Chapter 11 examines the evidence for and against the existence of discrimination in 
the labor market as well as the role of policy in addressing labor market discrimination. 
Many researchers believe that differences between blacks and whites in labor mar­
ket outcomes primarily reflect differences in the skills that people bring to the labor 
Introduction  3 market. Chapter 12 explores the black-white test score gap and issues regarding differ­
ences in access to schooling and desegregation. Chapter 13 reviews the evidence on dis­
crimination in other domains, including the justice system and customer markets. 
Just as poverty is more common among blacks than among whites, it is more 
common among women than among men and is particularly common among female-
headed households. Thus differences in earnings capacity between men and women 
may have an important impact on the prevalence of poverty. Chapter 14 addresses the 
debate over the source of this differential and policies designed to reduce it. 
Some readers of earlier drafts of this book have commented that it would benefit 
from a lengthier discussion of inequality. After all, one important explanation for the 
lack of a decline in poverty over the past three decades is the dramatic increase in in­
equality. In the concluding chapter, I argue that reducing inequality must be an impor­
tant component of any policy that reduces poverty. Nevertheless, I have made only a 
modest attempt to accommodate readers who have requested more on this subject. 
There are two reasons that I have not added a complete chapter or more on the 
study of inequality. The first is simply a matter of space and time. This book is already 
longer than either the publisher or I anticipated, and it may well contain more mate­
rial than can be covered in a typical semester course (although I do cover most of the 
material in a semester). 
The second reason is that the study of inequality in many ways relies on a different 
set of tools and methods than does the study of poverty and discrimination. By its 
nature, the theory of inequality requires a more global approach. The empirical analy­
sis of inequality, for the most part, uses a different statistical approach and, in par­
ticular, makes less use of actual and quasi-experiments, which are the focus of much of 
this book. 
2. Recent Developments in the Study of Poverty and Discrimination 
The earlier discussion may have given the impression that little has changed since Mar­
shall and George debated progress and poverty. In fact, the study of poverty in general 
and poverty policy in particular has changed dramatically over the past thirty years. A 
large part of the impetus for the change can be traced to the debate over the negative 
income tax. 
In 1962, the future Nobel laureate Milton Friedman proposed that the welfare 
system in the United States be replaced with a negative income tax.3 Under a negative 
income tax, all individuals or households with incomes below a certain level would 
receive a basic guaranteed annual income from the government. As household income 
increased, the government grant (or negative income tax) would be scaled back. When 
household income was sufficiently high, the household would not receive any grant 
from the government but instead would pay income tax as it would in a standard income 
tax system. Although Friedman was a well-known conservative, he was also a highly 
3. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962). 
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sional journals. 
Support for the negative income tax crossed political boundaries. The first proposal 
for a negative income tax came from the Johnson administration in 1965, and the 
1967 reforms to the welfare system reflect some of the spirit of the negative income tax 
proposal. Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan proposed a form of negative income tax that 
was opposed by welfare rights activists on the left.4 James Tobin, also a Nobel laureate 
but, in contrast with Friedman, a recognized liberal, designed a negative income tax 
proposal for the McGovern campaign in 1972.5 
The key aspects of the theoretical analysis can be summarized briefly. If the nega­
tive income tax were to be affordable, the rate at which the grant would be reduced as 
income increased would have to be substantial. At a minimum, the grant would de­
cline by one dollar for every three dollars of income and more probably by one dollar 
for every two dollars of income. In today’s terms, even using the lower rate, a worker 
earning nine dollars an hour would see his family’s grant fall by three dollars for each 
hour that he worked. Thus, in effect, he would be earning only six dollars an hour. Be­
cause the after-tax hourly wage of working families would be much lower but their 
overall income would be higher, these families might work less under a negative in­
come tax than they would otherwise.6 
On the other hand, under traditional welfare, benefits were typically reduced by 
one dollar for every one dollar a recipient earned. Thus people with very low potential 
earnings who were therefore unlikely to earn much more than they would receive from 
welfare had little or no incentive to work. Under a negative income tax, they would 
keep some of their earnings and thus have some incentive to work. The advocates of the 
negative income tax hoped that it would encourage very low-income families to work 
and not reduce labor supply very much among somewhat higher-income households. 
But of course it was possible that just the opposite would happen. Perhaps current 
welfare recipients would be little affected if their incentive to work were increased and 
there would be a big reduction in work effort among near-poor families who did not 
receive assistance through traditional welfare. This issue could not be resolved on the 
basis of theory alone. 
Economists began with observational studies, that is, they looked at the relation 
between after-tax wages and labor supply in the population. They relied on surveys of 
individuals who reported, among other variables, their hours of work and earnings or 
wage rate. 
We can think of an observational study in the following way. Suppose we find a 
sample of people who seem to be otherwise similar but some of whom earn six dollars 
4. Walter Williams, “The Continuing Struggle for a Negative Income Tax: A Review Article,” 
Journal of Human Resources 10 (Fall 1975): 427–44. 
5. Holcomb B. Noble, “James Tobin, Nobel Laureate in Economics and an Adviser to Kennedy, 
Dies at 84,” New York Times, March 13, 2002. 
6. For a formal discussion of the effects of income and wage rates on labor supply, see the dis­
cussion of the earned income tax credit in chapter 3. 
Introduction  5 an hour and some of whom earn nine dollars an hour. If the only difference between 
the two groups is that some people were lucky and got jobs paying nine dollars an hour 
and others were unlucky and got jobs paying six dollars hour, it may be reasonable to 
assume that if we cut the pay of the lucky people to six dollars an hour, they would act 
like the unlucky people. Suppose that similar people earning six dollars an hour worked 
two hours per week less than those earning nine dollars an hour. Then we might con­
clude that if we were to tax workers earning nine dollars an hour so that they ended 
up earning six dollars an hour, they would reduce their labor by two hours per week. 
The implicit assumption that the only difference between the groups is how lucky 
they were is very strong. It is likely that even though they look similar on paper, the 
people earning nine dollars an hour are somehow different from those earning six dol­
lars an hour. For example, they may be more skilled or work harder even though they 
have similar educations. Or their jobs may be different. The higher-paying job may be 
more dangerous or more demanding. So the real challenge for the statistician, and one 
to which we will devote a great deal of time in this book, is figuring out ways to obtain 
samples of people who differ only along the dimension we are trying to study. 
A classic book by Glen Cain and Harold Watts brought together seven papers fo­
cused on predicting the effect of a negative income tax on labor supply.7 In their con­
clusion, Cain and Watts point out the large range in the estimated effects of very sim­
ilar programs. One study found that a $3,000 guarantee coupled with a 50 percent tax 
rate would have a negligible effect on the labor supply of husbands. In contrast, a sec­
ond study predicted that a less generous program with a $2,400 guarantee and a 50 
percent tax rate would reduce the labor supply of male family members by 37 percent. 
The former study implied that the negative income tax would be a cost-effective ap­
proach to reducing poverty. The latter implied that it would be very costly. 
As reflected in this example, it is often very difficult to use observational data to ob­
tain convincing evidence of the causal effect of one variable (such as the after-tax wage 
or parental absence) on a second variable (such as labor supply or adult outcomes). If 
we could conduct an experiment in which we randomly assigned some people to have 
high wages and some people to have low wages, we would have much more convinc­
ing evidence regarding the relation between labor supply and after-tax wages. 
Because the stakes involved in instituting a negative income tax were so high, pol­
icy analysts convinced the federal government to conduct experiments in which some 
people were randomly assigned to be eligible for the negative income tax while others 
were randomly assigned to remain subject to traditional welfare. In the experimental 
group, there was also variation in the generosity of the program. Four experiments were 
conducted in the United States and a fifth in Canada. The largest of these is known as 
SIME/DIME (the Seattle Income Maintenance Experiment / Denver Income Mainte­
nance Experiment). 
Many policy analysts found the results of the experiments disappointing. Although 
the labor supply response was modest, it added substantially to the cost of the program. 
7. Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts, Income Maintenance and Labor Supply (New York: Acad­
emic Press, 1973). 
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supply response could account for over half of the costs.8 The least generous program 
would save $4 billion but would make 95 percent of recipients worse off. A program 
that would guarantee support at the poverty level and tax-back benefits at a rate of only 
50 percent would still make one-fourth of recipients worse off and would exceed the 
cost of the welfare program then current by $30 billion, an enormous increase.9 
There were also some “unintended consequences,” the social science equivalent of 
medical side effects. In particular, the divorce rate rose among recipients randomly as­
signed to the negative income tax.10 The combination of the costs of the labor supply 
effects and the effect on marriage led Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, an early sup­
porter of the negative income tax, to withdraw his support. 
Despite the failure of the policy proposal, the negative income tax experiments es­
tablished the value of large-scale experiments and helped to create the infrastructure to 
carry them out. Randomized experiments have become the “gold standard” by which 
empirical work on poverty and discrimination is judged. The welfare reform passed by 
Congress in 1996 was heavily influenced by the outcomes of a large number of exper­
iments that evaluated potential reforms. 
Of course, it is not possible to use experiments to evaluate all policy proposals. 
Some experiments would be immoral if not impossible to perform. And a badly 
conducted experiment is still bad research even though that research uses an experi­
ment. Other experiments are simply too expensive compared with the benefit they are 
expected to bring. In such cases, researchers can sometimes rely on what are called 
“natural experiments” or “quasi-experiments.” 
These experiments attempt to find situations that mimic randomized trials. In 
these situations, it is as if the researcher had randomly assigned participants to a treat­
ment or control group. Participants are said to be as good as randomly assigned. We 
will discuss later many of the issues associated with particular quasi-experiments. In 
general, however, we will be concerned with whether participants are truly “as good as 
randomly assigned” and with whether the control group may be affected by the exper­
iment. The answers to these questions are frequently unclear even in the case of true 
experiments but especially when we examine quasi-experiments. 
Despite the difficulties associated with particular experimental or quasi-experimental 
studies, such studies, when done well, are generally more convincing than observational 
studies. This does not mean that there is no longer a role for observational studies in 
8. Michael C. Keeley, Philip K. Robins, Robert G. Spiegelman, and Richard W. West, “The 
Labour Supply Effects and Costs of Alternative Negative Income Tax Programmes,” Journal of Hu­
man Resources 13 (Winter 1978): 3–36. 
9. Robert G. Spiegelman and K. E. Yaeger, “The Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Ex­
periments: Overview,” Journal of Human Resources 15 (Fall 1980): 463–79. 
10. Lyle P. Groeneveld, Nancy B. Tuma, and Michael T. Hannan, “The Effects of Negative In­
come Tax Programs on Marital Dissolution,” Journal of Human Resources 15 (Fall 1980): 654–74; but 
see Glen G. Cain and Douglas A. Wissoker, “A Reanalysis of Marital Stability in the Seattle-Denver 
Income-Maintenance Experiment,” American Journal of Sociology 95 (March 1990): 1235–69, for a 
reanalysis challenging this conclusion. 
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justifying more careful experimental study. Or, if it is impossible to design a convinc­
ing experiment or quasi-experiment, we may be forced to fall back on an observa­
tional study. 
Moreover, for several reasons, experiments are only imperfect substitutes for theory. 
First, theory is an important guide to which experiments to conduct and how to in­
terpret them. Second, suppose we learn (as we do in chapter 11) that if they apply ran­
domly for jobs, individuals with names that reveal that they are black are less likely to 
be called for an interview. Theory will tell us that the effect of this discriminatory be­
havior depends a great deal on how the labor market works. If applicants have a good 
idea of which firms discriminate and which do not, they will not apply randomly, 
and the experiment will not give a clear impression of the effect of this discriminatory 
behavior on applicants. We might follow up the initial experiment with a study of 
how black applicants decide where to apply for jobs and, in particular, see whether 
they avoid the firms for which we have evidence of discriminatory behavior. 
By now it may occur to you that the study of poverty and discrimination increasingly 
resembles the study of medicine in its reliance on experiments. It would be false to view 
medicine as atheoretical. Theory guides the choice of medicines and medical procedures 
to study. Nor is empirical analysis in medicine purely experimental. We learn a great deal 
from observational studies. Often observational studies justify experimental studies. But 
ultimately, experimental studies are the strongest guide to good practice. New medicines 
are subject to clinical trials in which outcomes from those receiving the medicine are 
compared with outcomes from those receiving either no treatment or the standard treat­
ment. And researchers watch for unintended consequences in the form of side effects. 
Research on poverty and discrimination certainly does not rival experimental medical 
research, let alone research in microbiology. This reflects in part the difficulty of work­
ing with human beings who can see through experiments. A participant in a negative 
income tax experiment who knows that the experiment will last only three years need 
not respond to the experiment in the same way that she would if a negative income tax 
were established permanently. In contrast, we expect that the body’s response to medica­
tion is not affected by the participant’s understanding that the experiment is of limited 
duration (although willingness to take the medication consistently may be affected). 
Research in both medicine and the social sciences suffers from the fact that the 
environment changes in response to our policies. Getting a flu shot reduces not only 
the chance of getting the flu but also the probability of spreading it to others. Thus the 
effect of a policy making flu shots freely available would be different from the effect 
that would be predicted by a small-scale experiment. Similarly, with a universal nega­
tive income tax, the decline in labor force participation would affect the availability of 
jobs and the wages they paid. Again, this means that we cannot dispense with theory. 
3. The Object of This Book 
What do we know about poverty and discrimination? And how do we know it? The 
body of literature on this topic is enormous. Unfortunately, much of what has been 
Chapter 1  8 written is designed to further a political agenda, and much of the rest is just not very 
good. 
The goal of this book is to help you distinguish the good research from the rest. I 
discuss in detail a small number of the best studies on each topic. This approach will 
allow you to understand not only the principal findings of the study but also the weak­
nesses that limit our confidence in its results. As the introduction to this chapter should 
make clear, even the best studies are imperfect. I try to avoid summarizing a large num­
ber of studies, many of which suffer from significant shortcomings. When choosing 
among good studies, I have tried to select the one that is most accessible. 
Inevitably, on occasion I am forced to say “most researchers believe that” or “most 
studies show that” or “the evidence is mixed” because it would be too time-consuming 
to discuss the individual studies. In general, however, I try to resist the temptation to 
be the ultimate judge of a body of literature rather than giving you the tools and in­
formation you need to evaluate it. 
You may come away from the book feeling less sure about what you know than 
you did before you read it. That is good, not bad. Although many people offer simple 
solutions to the problems of poverty and discrimination, these problems are genuinely 
complex. If there were simple solutions, we probably would have done away with both 
of these problems. After all, most people think that poverty and discrimination are bad 
and would like to get rid of them if they could. 
We will discuss various policies that have been tried in the attempt to end poverty 
and/or discrimination. We will discuss whether they worked. In some cases, we will 
consider arguments that the very policies intended to reduce poverty and discrimina­
tion have increased them. This should give you an idea of just how hard it will be to 
solve these problems. There are probably no “right” answers to the questions that we 
will raise. But there are better and worse answers and even wrong answers. 
Some people will find this conclusion depressing. A number of students have made 
comments to me like “How can you stand working in this area? The answer is always 
‘We don’t know.’” But it is precisely because there is so much that we do not know and 
understand about such an important topic that it is fun to study. 
And of course, except in some deep metaphysical sense, it is not true that we do not 
know anything. We know a great deal, and we have learned much of it in the past ten 
years. Still, it is also important to recognize what we do not know and that the evidence 
for what we think we know is often weak. 
This book concentrates on statistical analyses and formal theories. Certainly our 
understanding of poverty and discrimination is informed by careful and thoughtful de­
scriptions of the poverty experience. Reading ethnographic studies11 gives enormous 
insight into the lives of poor people, and this book will draw on these insights. But we 
will not talk a lot about what it is like to be poor and how it feels to be the victim of 
discrimination. Instead, we will spend a little time doing economic theory and a lot of 
time looking at arguments based on statistical analysis. 
11. Ethnographic studies provide rich descriptions of the functioning of human societies. Several 
excellent ethnographies are included in the section on additional readings at the end of this chapter. 
Introduction  9 In a sense, this book is about statistical analysis. By this I do not mean that it covers 
statistical techniques, although the appendix to this chapter covers the basics you need 
to read this book. I mean that it is about how to assess the quality of statistical argu­
ments. Statistical arguments are generally imperfect. There are usually other expla­
nations for a result than the one presented by a researcher. Sometimes those other ex­
planations are equally or even more plausible than the one presented. 
Understanding how to assess statistical arguments is a skill that is valuable well be­
yond the study of poverty and discrimination. Businessmen, doctors, policy analysts, 
and many others rely on statistical analysis. Understanding the quality of this analysis 
may be important for making the right business decision or choosing the right medical 
approach. Understanding the limits of statistical analysis can also help you understand 
why policy analysts disagree about policies. I refer to “policy analysts.” I could say “so­
cial scientists” or “economists,” but the poverty field is highly policy oriented, and this 
book follows in that tradition. 
4. Why Do Policy Analysts Disagree? 

The Limits of Statistical Arguments

Ultimately statistical analysis is about correlation, the degree to which characteristics 
tend to vary together: more educated people tend to have higher incomes than do less 
educated people; teenage mothers tend to have lower incomes than women who did 
not have children as teenagers; users of the leading asthma medicine are more likely to 
have bad asthma than people who do not use that medicine. 
It is the policy analyst who interprets these correlations as showing a causal relation: 
getting more education increases income; having a child as a teenager lowers a woman’s 
income; using the leading asthma medicine worsens rather than improves asthma. But 
the opposite interpretations are also possible: people who are going to earn more money 
do not feel as much pressure to start working soon and thus get more education; 
women who expect to have low earnings are more likely to become teenage mothers; 
people who have bad asthma are more likely to use the leading asthma medicine. Or 
some other factor may cause both characteristics: smart people tend to choose to get 
more education, and smart people tend to have higher earnings; women from dis­
advantaged backgrounds are more likely to become single mothers and are more likely 
to have low incomes; doctors who treat people who live in the Bronx like to prescribe 
the leading asthma medicine, and people who live in the Bronx are more likely than 
other Americans to have asthma. 
In each case, it may seem obvious to you which of these explanations is correct. I 
certainly believe that the most likely reason that heavy users of the leading asthma 
medicine are more likely to have asthma is that asthmatics are the people most likely 
to use the medicine. But I cannot prove that my belief is correct simply by pointing to 
the relation between medicine use and asthma. If another policy analyst is convinced 
that use of the medicine and asthma are related because the medicine causes (or 
worsens) asthma, we will have to look for new evidence to help us distinguish between 
the two explanations. 
10  Chapter 1 Perhaps we can find an experiment in which a researcher randomly gave some 
people the asthma medicine and others a placebo. If we find that asthma was no more 
common among those receiving the medicine than among those who received the 
placebo, we may feel justified in concluding that the medicine does not cause asthma 
and that my original belief was correct: people who use the leading asthma medicine 
are more likely to have asthma than are people who do not because people with asthma 
are more likely to use the medicine. But the experiment is not definitive. Perhaps the 
reason that asthma is no more common among those who get the medicine than 
among those who get the placebo is because the placebo also causes asthma. 
Policy analysts disagree in part because they have different beliefs about how likely 
these alternative explanations are. All policy analysts work with implicit models of how 
the world works that reflect both their life experience and their academic training. So­
cial workers and economists do not necessarily view the world in the same way. Faced 
with the finding that teenage mothers have lower incomes than women who did not 
give birth as teens, one researcher may see evidence that teenage motherhood causes 
poverty while another sees evidence that poverty causes teenage motherhood. An econ­
omist is likely to respond that if having a child as a teenager is extremely costly, only 
those with strong reasons to have children as teenagers will do so. They may therefore 
be inclined to believe an explanation indicating that the poor economic prospects of 
some women lead them to have children at an early age. Child psychologists and social 
workers are less likely to believe that teenagers make rational decisions, which 
may make them more likely to believe that having a child at an early age has major 
negative consequences for the mother. Of course, both or neither may be true. 
It would be easy for you to translate the last paragraph as “It’s all a matter of opin­
ion.” I hope that you will not. There are weaker and stronger statistical arguments. The 
best way to find out which, if either, of these arguments is correct would be to conduct 
two experiments. In one experiment, we would randomly assign girls to poor and 
wealthy families and see if there was a difference in the proportions becoming teenage 
mothers. In the other experiment, we would force some teenage girls to become mothers 
and ensure that others did not. If the teenage mothers ended up with lower incomes 
than the other women, we would be reasonably confident that teenage motherhood 
lowered their incomes. If there were no difference in the earnings of the two groups, 
we would conclude that teenage motherhood did not cause lower incomes. 
But even here there would be a problem. Perhaps some girls receive lower incomes 
as a result of becoming teenage mothers and others receive higher incomes. Those who 
will receive higher incomes become teenage mothers while those who would be hurt 
financially do not become teenage mothers. So our experiment would give the wrong 
answer, because it asks what is the effect of teenage motherhood on the average teenage 
girl rather than on the type of teenager who becomes a teenage mother. 
Of course, both of these experiments would be totally immoral and would not be 
conducted by any ethical person. However, we will see that clever researchers often try 
to imitate experiments by comparing groups that are similar except for the factor 
they are examining. Perhaps we could compare twin sisters, one of whom gave birth 
while a teenager and the other of whom did not. A study discussed later in this book 
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teenagers. 
5. Why Do Policy Analysts Disagree? The Role of Values 
To some extent, policy analysts disagree about policies because they disagree about 
their effects. We have seen that it is essentially impossible to prove the case for or against 
a policy based on data alone. However, it is frequently the case that policy analysts do 
agree about the effects. 
Later in the book, we will examine the effects of minimum wage laws. There is 
considerable consensus regarding these effects. Most (although certainly not all) econ­
omists agree that minimum wage laws (at the levels found in the United States) reduce 
employment but that the effect is small. They also agree that minimum wage laws 
reduce wage inequality but do not have a large effect on income inequality or on the 
poverty rate. 
Given this consensus, why do economists disagree about whether the minimum wage 
should be raised? One explanation is values.12 Minimum wage laws are inefficient— 
they reduce employment—and most of us agree that is bad. But minimum wage laws 
reduce wage inequality, may reduce family income inequality, and make those people 
working in low-wage jobs more capable of supporting themselves. Many people, per­
haps most, think that those are good things. We must now decide what weight to put 
on the good and bad effects. Reasonable people can arrive at different judgments. 
Most policy analysts have concluded that the negative income tax is too expensive 
because it reduces work effort too much. However, others disagree. The philosopher 
and economist Philippe van Parijs argues that the reduction in work effort is a benefit, 
not a cost, of the negative income tax. In his view, society’s objective should be to have 
people work only for the innate pleasure they derive from working and not for the 
income they receive. The fact that people work less when they can receive a subsidy 
from the government makes the financial cost of the negative income tax higher but 
also lessens the rat race.13 
Similarly, when welfare reform was passed during the Clinton administration, most 
people believed that it would encourage families to leave welfare and find jobs (which 
most people felt was good). Most people also believed that it would leave those people 
who did not find jobs worse off. Part of the disagreement over the reform had to do 
12. Victor R. Fuchs, Alan B. Krueger, and James M. Poterba, in “Economists’ Views about Para­
meters, Values, and Policies: Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics,” Journal of Economic Lit­
erature 36 (September 1998): 1387–425, examine the relation among values, beliefs about the effects 
of policies, and support for policies. They find that among economists specializing in labor economics 
and public economics, the two areas they study, policy disagreements are influenced much more by 
differences in values than by differences in beliefs about the effects of policies. 
13. See, for example, Robert Van der Veen and Philippe van Parijs, “A Capitalist Road to Com­
munism,” Theory and Society 15 (September 1986): 635–55. 
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much some valued increasing the number of children growing up in families that were 
independent of welfare and how much others valued making it less likely that children 
would go hungry. 
Put differently, almost all policy analysts would agree that if there is a way to make 
some people better off without making anyone worse off, we should do it. This is 
known as the Pareto principle. However, most policies do not fit nicely into this cate­
gory. Policies that do not help anyone will generally not receive much support, while 
those that help at least some people and do not hurt anyone will be quickly enacted. 
What is left is a set of policies that help some people and hurt others. The policy ana­
lyst can help determine who is helped and who is hurt, and by how much and in what 
ways. Ultimately, however, the policy advocate (who may be the same person) takes over 
and makes the case that the benefits to some outweigh the costs to others or vice versa. 
6. A Case Study: Retention in Grade 
Writing in 1989, one analyst concluded, “There is probably no widespread educational 
practice as thoroughly discredited as retention in grade. If the research undercutting this 
practice is sound, the task is to uproot outdated misconceptions appealing to educators’ 
‘common sense’ wisdom.”14 
How did researchers “know” retention was bad, and why would policy makers not 
listen? 
6.1. The Early Research.  What we knew was that students who were retained in 
grade did not catch up with their peers. If anything, they fell further behind. They had 
lower self-esteem than other students and were more likely to drop out. 
If retaining students in grade caused these differences, for most of us, this would 
make a compelling case that retention is a bad policy. However, there are good reasons 
for questioning whether the relation is causal. Students who struggle in school are 
more likely to be retained in grade. Students who have difficulty with school one year 
are more likely than other students to have difficulty in other years. We would not be 
surprised to find that these students also are more likely to drop out and to have low 
self-esteem even if they are not retained in grade. 
To use an analogy, compared with those who receive high grades, students who re­
ceive low grades in high school do worse, on average, on the SAT (Scholastic Aptitude 
Test) or the ACT (American College Test). Few people would suggest that giving every­
one As would improve SAT scores. 
Serious researchers understood this problem. They tried to find students who were 
not retained in grade but who looked on paper a lot like the students who were re­
tained in grade. They could match students on factors such as their race, sex, month 
14. Roy P. Doyle, “The Resistance of Conventional Wisdom to Research Evidence: The Case of 
Retention in Grade,” Phi Delta Kappan 71 (November 1989): 215–20. 
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tained in grade was associated with bad outcomes. 
How convincing is this? Suppose we found a sample of same-sex twins in which 
one twin was retained in grade and the other was not. We would still be worried that 
the twin who was retained in grade was more academically challenged than the one 
who was not and would therefore have done worse anyway. Back to our analogy. If the 
twin who got lower grades in school did worse on the SAT, would we blame the low 
grades for the lower performance on the SAT? 
6.2. Recent Research.  We can do better if we find a setting in which there is a rel­
atively sharp cutoff establishing who is promoted and who is retained. Suppose a large 
school system sets a rule that students who score 65 or higher on a citywide test will 
be promoted, while all those who score 64 or less will be retained in grade. We will 
assume that the test is administered in a standard manner across schools and is fairly 
graded. 
All tests have a random component. Was the student lucky or unlucky in his choice 
of topics to study? Did she accidentally mark the wrong box on the answer sheet? Did 
he make a lot of lucky guesses? For this reason, students who score 65 on the test 
should be a lot like students who score 64 on the test. 
We can compare the future performance of students who scored 64 on the test and 
were therefore retained with the future performance of those who scored 65 and were 
therefore promoted. If retention helps students, we would expect the future scores of 
those with a test score of 64 to be higher. If it hurts, we would expect the opposite. If 
there is no difference, retention neither helps not hurts, but given its cost, it is probably 
not a good idea. 
Of course, in the real world, the line between being promoted and being retained in 
grade is likely to be a little fuzzy. The district may have a waiver policy that allows some 
students who fail the test to be promoted anyway, and it probably has other require­
ments that can cause a student who passes the test to be retained. But the basic idea 
remains the same. If, for example, 95 percent of students who pass the test are pro­
moted and only 20 percent of those who fail it are promoted, if retention is good, we 
should see better future outcomes for students with 64s than for students with 65s.15 
Jenny Nagaoka and Melissa Roderick used essentially this approach. In Chicago, 
third graders who, after a summer remedial program, were more than one year below 
grade level on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills reading test were retained in grade. For sixth 
graders the cutoff was one and a half years below grade level. Nagaoka and Roderick 
compared students up to three-tenths of a year below this cutoff with students at this 
cutoff or an equivalent amount above. For both grades, as the rules imply, those just 
above the cutoff were much more likely to be promoted than those just below it.16 
15. There is a way to adjust these differences to obtain an estimate of the effect of retention. We 
discuss this later in the book. 
16. Jenny Nagaoka and Melissa Roderick, “Ending Social Promotion: The Effects of Retention” 
(Consortium of Chicago School Research, Chicago, 2004). 
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showed somewhat more improvement in performance the following year but that most 
of this difference had disappeared by the end of two years. For sixth graders, those 
scoring just above the cutoff had larger gains one year later, and this difference was 
similar two years later. 
Is this the end of the discussion? Should we now be convinced that retention has 
only transitory benefits for third graders and longer-lasting negative effects for sixth 
graders? We will talk about more global reasons for not drawing this conclusion later 
in this section, but for now there are two issues that must be addressed. The first is spe­
cific to the study and helps to underline the importance of examining studies in detail 
rather than merely summarizing results. The second addresses a more general issue 
with the approach. 
The first point is that Chicago had high-stakes testing in the third, sixth, and eighth 
grades. Students who were retained in grade therefore faced a high-stakes test one year 
after being retained. We might expect them to take the exam more seriously than 
someone taking a low-stakes exam and therefore to perform better. It is plausible that 
the one-year difference overstates the gain to retention. Conversely, sixth graders who 
were promoted took another high-stakes test two years later, while most of the sixth 
graders who were not promoted were taking a low-stakes test. This is likely to mean 
that the harm from retention two years later was exaggerated for sixth graders. 
The second problem is that even though students above and below the cutoff were 
similar, they were not identical. There are good reasons both for believing students 
who did particularly badly on a test would show more improvement than other stu­
dents and for believing that they would fall further behind. How can we get around 
this problem? 
One way is to look at what happens when the cutoff is not important. Although 
they did not focus on it, Nagaoka and Roderick showed that in 2000, when the cutoff 
used in the study was not in effect, those below the study cutoff showed very slightly 
less improvement over one year than those slightly above the study cutoff. Unfortu­
nately, data for two years later were not available. 
The second approach is to look at differences with those slightly more above and 
slightly more below the cutoffs. To return to our earlier example, we could look at the 
difference between those scoring 63 and those scoring 64 on the test and between those 
scoring 65 and those scoring 66 on the test. If the difference between those scoring 64 
and those scoring 65 on the test was similar to these other two differences, we would 
conclude that retention had no effect. If the improvement in score was greater going 
from 64 to 65 than from 63 to 64 or from 65 to 66, we would conclude that retention 
hurt the students, and if it was smaller, we would conclude that it helped them. 
Brian Jacob and Lars Lefgren used essentially this approach to look at the Chicago 
data.17 They examined both reading and mathematics scores because students had to 
17.  Brian A. Jacob and Lars Lefgren, “Remedial Education and Student Achievement: A 
Regression-Discontinuity Analysis,” Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (February 2004): 226–44. 
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reached by Nagaoka and Roderick. In the third grade, they found that retention had a 
large positive one-year effect on reading that was mostly gone by the end of two years. 
In math, the positive one-year effect was diminished but not completely gone after two 
years. In the sixth grade they found a small negative one-year effect in reading that in­
creased in the second year. For math, there was no clear negative effect in either year. 
6.3. What Should We Conclude?  The results of the two Chicago studies are rea­
sonably consistent. For those close to the cutoff, retention in grade has some positive 
but probably transitory effects on third graders and some negative and possibly transi­
tory effects on sixth graders. Although we might make a case that we should continue 
to study the effects on third graders, surely at least for older students, these new studies 
support the quotation at the beginning of this section that describes retention as “thor­
oughly discredited.” 
Sorry, but we should not be so fast to agree with that conclusion. There are a large 
number of questions we can ask that might stop us from drawing that conclusion even 
about retention of sixth graders. Both studies looked at the effect of retention on per­
formance at the same age. What would happen if we looked at performance in the same 
grade? Did sixth graders who were retained do better or worse on the eighth-grade test 
than similar students who were promoted? We do not know. Because the mastery of 
math for the two groups was similar when the retained students were in seventh grade 
and the promoted students were in eighth grade, it is a good bet that the retained stu­
dents did better on the eighth-grade test, but we cannot be sure until we check. And it 
is very uncertain whether they did better or worse on the eighth-grade reading test. 
And, to make matters more complex, suppose that we do the study and we conclude 
that, in the long run, students retained in sixth grade do better than their promoted 
peers at each grade level but worse than their promoted peers at each age level. What 
policy should we favor? Our evaluation becomes very complex. There is good evidence 
that being old for their grade makes students more likely to drop out.18 So some stu­
dents will get less education because they were retained in grade, and, therefore, based on 
the assumption at the beginning of the paragraph, leave school with fewer skills. Other 
students will not reduce their education, and under these assumptions, will leave school 
with more skills. But to acquire these additional skills, they will have spent an extra 
year in school at great cost to both themselves and to the public. Even if retention does 
increase the skills of these students, it may be a very cost-ineffective approach. 
There are at least three additional reasons that an advocate of retention might ad­
here to that position in the light of this research. The first is that, by their nature, the 
18. Joshua D. Angrist and Alan B. Krueger, “The Effect of Age at School Entry on Educational 
Attainment: An Application of Instrumental Variables with Moments from Two Samples,” Journal 
of the American Statistical Association 87 (June 1992): 328–36, and Susan E. Mayer and David Knut­
son, “Does the Timing of School Affect How Much Children Learn?” in Susan E. Mayer and Paul E. 
Peterson, eds., Earning and Learning: How Schools Matter (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1999), 79–102. 
16  Chapter 1 Nagaoka-Roderick and Jacob-Lefgren studies tell us only about the effect of retention on 
students with scores near the cutoff chosen by the Chicago Public Schools (CPS). Per­
haps retention is helpful to some students but the CPS set the promotion bar too high. 
The second is that we have looked only at the effect on students who were retained, 
but there are important incentive effects from high-stakes testing.19 If students work 
harder in order to pass the exam, perhaps the benefit from the extra effort outweighs 
any harm from a retention policy. We do not know that the incentive effects are im­
portant (or even positive), but if they are, they may make the effects positive for some 
students and negative for others. Even if policy analysts agreed on all the effects, they 
might reach different conclusions. 
Finally, someone could conclude that the Chicago experience suggests that reten­
tion is not generally bad but rather that it is a bad policy as practiced by the CPS. They 
could maintain that a more sophisticated retention policy with special programs for 
retained students or one that relied on multiple and better indicators of academic 
mastery of the material would produce positive results. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
At this point you may be feeling frustration. You want to know whether retention is 
good or bad. Are the critics of “social promotion” correct, or are they just promoting a 
policy that sounds good, putting politics ahead of the sound judgment of most educa­
tion professionals? 
Throughout this book, I will try to play the role of objective arbiter. I regret to tell 
you that we will often end up where we are with the retention versus social promotion 
debate. There is some research that points in a particular direction, but there is a good 
deal that we do not know. For the most part, in this book I have resisted the tempta­
tion to discuss research that I consider bad and to elaborate on its obvious weaknesses. 
I certainly point out the weaknesses of many of the studies that I do discuss, but I view 
that differently. Many of the weaknesses are simply unavoidable, and it is often better 
to rely on a weak lamp than on none at all. Still, there is ample ground for reasonable 
people to disagree, both because the available research leaves many unanswered ques­
tions and because some policy positions depend on value judgments. 
I am concerned that, having learned that it will not teach you how to solve poverty 
and discrimination, you will stop reading this book and drop the course in which it is 
assigned. But if you resist that temptation, I truly believe that by the end of this book 
you will be better at evaluating social policy options, and because you care enough 
about poverty and discrimination to be reading this book, that is important. 
Therefore, in the last chapter, I will drop my cloak of academic distance and out­
line my conclusions, based on the material in this book, about what policies we should 
pursue. But that chapter is the least important chapter in the book. 
For now, because the subject is only marginally related to poverty and discrimina­
tion policy, let me appease you by addressing what I think we should conclude about 
19. We discuss this issue in more detail in the chapter on education reform. 
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design a randomized study of retention and social promotion. Under the impetus of 
the No Child Left Behind Act and the standards movement, the United States is cur­
rently moving rapidly in the direction of widespread use of high-stakes testing and 
ending social promotion. Enormous resources are being directed at such testing. To 
me, it is unthinkable that we would not be devoting substantial resources to determin­
ing the effectiveness of the policy. 
This may seem like a cheap conclusion for a researcher to reach, but it is not. There 
are strong moral restrictions on the types of experiments to which we should subject 
children. If I believed that retention was “thoroughly discredited,” advocating experi­
mental research would be immoral, as it would be if I believed the opposite. But I do 
believe that it is possible that we have been too lax historically (although the public 
probably underestimates the extent to which retention has become more common over 
the past twenty years).20 I also believe that even if retention in grade proves less harm­
ful than its critics maintain, it is unlikely to be a cost-effective policy for providing 
remediation. If we are moving in the direction of using retention more frequently, we 
should have better evidence of its effectiveness. 
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9. Questions for Discussion 
1.	 What is the difference between correlation and causality? If two events 
tend to occur together or sequentially, must one of them cause the other? 
2.	 Explain what is meant by the Pareto principle. What are the limitations 
of this principle as a guide to policy? 
3.	 A friend tells you that you should never be a patient in a teaching hospital 
because the death rate among patients in teaching hospitals is higher than 
in other hospitals. How do you respond? 
4.	 Suppose that, relative to policy analysts who oppose more funding for job 
training programs, policy analysts who support more funding for job 
20. See Robert M. Hauser, “Should We End Social Promotion? Truth and Consequences” (Work­
ing Paper 99-06, Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1999). 
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ate a larger increase in employment. Does this mean that policy analysts’ 
beliefs are biased by their values? 
5.	 Suppose that policy analysts who support and those who oppose more

funding for Head Start, on average, have similar beliefs about the effec­

tiveness of the program. Does this mean that policy analysts’ views about

policy are not influenced by their beliefs about the scientific evidence?

10. Appendix: A Quick Guide to Statistics 
This appendix covers what you need to know to understand the statistics used in this 
book. It focuses on how to interpret the statistics rather than how they are calculated. 
It is not intended as a substitute for a standard statistics course that teaches the theory 
underlying the statistics. 
10.1. Randomness.  Before we discuss statistics, we need to think about what we 
mean when we say something is random. Suppose somebody shuffles a standard fifty-
two-card deck. What is the probability that the top card is the ace of spades? In some 
sense, the probability is either one or zero. Either the top card is the ace of spades, in 
which case the probability is one, or the top card is not the ace of spades, in which case 
the probability is zero. But assuming that the person shuffled the deck fairly and that 
we have not looked at the top card or otherwise “cheated,” from our perspective, the 
probability is 1/52. With more information, the outcome might not be random, but 
given our information it is. 
The same will be true of many of the phenomena we study throughout this book. 
Test scores may or may not be random in some deep sense, but there are certainly many 
factors that affect test scores and that we do not measure. Therefore, from our perspec­
tive, test scores are random. Suppose we find one hundred pairs of students. We choose 
the pairs so that they look as similar as is feasible. To be part of the same pair, the stu­
dents must be of the same sex, age, and race; have the same family structure; go to the 
same school; and have the same sixth-grade Iowa Test of Basic Skills math and reading 
scores. We will assume that under the rules of the school system, all are supposed to be 
retained in grade. As part of an experiment, one member of each pair is given a waiver 
from the school system rules and is promoted, while the other is retained in grade. 
Unless promotion or retention is much better for all students (which seems un­
likely), some of the “experimental” students who are promoted will do better and 
some will do worse than the “control” students who are retained in grade. Maybe 
one student in the pair was generally a good student but had been sick the night before 
the test that determined promotion or retention and did poorly. The other member of 
the pair was even weaker than the test scores suggest but had made a lot of lucky 
guesses. The first member of the pair will probably do better next time whether he is 
the one who is promoted or the one who is retained. 
From our perspective, the number of promoted students who do better than their 
matched retained counterparts is a random variable. We could also look at the difference 
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retained. This, too, would be a random variable. And because each difference is a 
random variable, the average difference across the one hundred pairs is also a random 
variable. 
10.2. The Mean and Standard Deviation.  Suppose we give a test to a large number 
of students. We could list the entire distribution. That is, we could say that twenty got 
a 0, twenty-eight got a 1, thirty-five got a 2, and so on, up to the top score. If there are 
a lot of possible scores, this would be tedious and hard to interpret. One thing every 
student knows to ask is “What was the average on the test?” Statisticians call the aver­
age the mean. 
But knowing the mean on the test is not enough. If the mean was 60, is a 50 an 
okay grade or a terrible grade? If the grades are all spread out from 0 to 100, a 50 is not 
too bad. If everyone got very close to 60, 50 is near the bottom. We would like to have 
a way of summarizing how dispersed the grades are without listing all the grades. There 
are many ways to do this. 
One way statisticians measure dispersion is the standard deviation. The formula 
for the standard deviation is given in the next paragraph, but it is more important to 
understand how the standard deviation relates to the dispersion of the variable. We 
will discuss this relation after giving a formal definition of the standard deviation and 
describing the normal distribution. 
To obtain the standard deviation, we first take all the observations of the random 
variable and calculate their mean. We then take the value of each observation of the 
random variable and subtract the mean. We then take this difference and multiply it 
by itself. This gives us the squared deviation of the measurement from the mean mea­
surement. Next we add up all the squared deviations and divide by the number of 
measurements to get the mean squared deviation from the mean.21 This is called the 
variance. The square root of the variance is the standard deviation. 
10.3. The Normal Distribution.  Many random variables have what is called a 
normal distribution. The normal distribution is sometimes referred to as a bell curve. 
The normal distribution has a very useful feature: it can be fully described by just two 
values, its mean and its standard deviation. We can use the mean and standard devia­
tion to describe how likely it is that, if we pick randomly from a normal distribution, 
we will obtain a particular value of set of values. In particular, 95 percent of the time, 
a random variable drawn from a normal distribution will lie within 1.96 (or approx­
imately two) standard deviations of the mean. Furthermore, 2.5 percent of the time 
it will be more than 1.96 standard deviations above the mean, and 2.5 percent of the 
time it will be more than 1.96 standard deviations below the mean. Similarly, 90 per­
cent of the time it will be within 1.64 standard deviations of the mean, with the re­
21. We can also divide by the number of observations minus one. The measures have slightly dif­
ferent properties but for most practical purposes are indistinguishable. 
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above and below the mean. 
10.4. Two Key Theorems.  One important theorem in statistics says that (in most 
cases) if we take a lot of observations of a random variable and then take their mean, 
the estimated mean will be close to the true mean. So if we flip a coin a lot of times, 
the fraction of times that it comes up heads will be very close to the true probability of 
its coming up heads. 
A second important theorem in statistics says that if we take the mean of a large 
number of independent random variables, the mean will be approximately normally 
distributed. Many random variables are the result of the offsetting effects of a large num­
ber of very small factors. For example, how tall someone is depends on both genetics 
and a large number of environmental factors. It is not surprising that we frequently 
observe the normal distribution in nature. 
These two theorems are very helpful. They tell us, for example, that if we have 
enough pairs, the average difference in the test scores in our sample will be close to the 
true average difference and that the average will be approximately normally distributed. 
Acting as if a distribution is normal often yields quite accurate results. It turns out 
that if we flip a fair coin one hundred times, the number of heads will have a standard 
deviation of five. Equivalently, the coin will come up heads an average of half (.5) of 
the time, with a standard deviation of .05. Using the normal distribution, we would 
expect the number of heads to be more than forty and less than sixty 95 percent of the 
time. We can show that the true probability is 94.3 percent, so the approximation is 
pretty accurate. 
Of course, not all distributions are normal. Wages are not normally distributed, but 
if we take the logarithm of the wage, it is approximately normally distributed. Other 
distributions cannot be made normal even by redefining the variable. Despite this 
caveat, in most cases we will be quite accurate if we treat an estimate based on a large 
number of observations as normally distributed. 
10.5. The Standard Error of an Estimate.  Because an estimate is likely to be a nor­
mally distributed random variable, if we know its mean and standard deviation, we will 
know a great deal about it. In some cases, we can figure out the mean and standard 
deviation by relying on statistical theory. If promotion and retention are equally good, 
half the time the person who is promoted will do better and half the time the person 
retained will do better. If this is true, the mean number of our one hundred pairs in 
which the person promoted does better should be fifty. And, as mentioned earlier for 
the coin toss, the standard deviation will be five. 
In other cases, we will have to estimate the standard deviation based on information 
about the observations in our data. Statisticians have developed methods for estimat­
ing what the standard deviation of the recorded mean will be without actually esti­
mating lots of different means. We will not discuss exactly how they do this, but we 
can look at the general principle. If the test scores in our pairs differ by almost the 
same amount (e.g., in every pair the retained student does two points better than the 
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estimate, all estimates based on samples have associated standard errors. In this 
book and in newspapers, you will often find statements of this form: “According 
to the Bureau of the Census, the poverty rate in the United States in 2001 was 
11.7 percent.” In fact, the Census Bureau provides information to help readers 
calculate standard errors of its estimates.22 Based on this information, we can 
calculate that the standard error of this estimate is about .14. We believe that 95 
percent of the time if the Census Bureau had used a different (but similarly 
drawn) sample of the population, the estimated poverty rate would have fallen 
between 11.4 percent and 12.0 percent. For many purposes, it is unimportant 
whether the poverty rate is 11.7 percent or 11.4 percent, so being casual about 
standard errors causes no harm, but if we wish to make a point based on small 
differences in poverty rates, we will have to be aware that poverty rates are esti­
mates and not exact. And we should remember that estimated poverty rates for 
smaller groups such as blacks or Hispanics are more imprecise. 
promoted student), the standard deviation of the data will be low and our estimate of 
the standard deviation of the mean will also be low. If there is a lot of variation across 
pairs, so that in some pairs the retained student does a lot better and in others the pro­
moted student does a lot better, the standard deviation of the data will be high, and so 
will the estimated standard deviation of the mean. We refer to our estimate of the stan­
dard deviation as the standard error of our estimate of the mean. 
Thus, for example, we might report that our estimate of the difference in achieve­
ment between retained and promoted students was two points with a standard error of 
four. This is often written with the estimate on top and the standard error in parentheses 
underneath:  2 . 
(4) 
10.6. Confidence Intervals and Statistical Significance.  Our best estimate of the 
average of all the means we would record is the one mean we have actually calculated. 
Using the fact that the distribution of the mean is approximately normal, we estimate 
that if we were to estimate the mean many times, 95 percent of the time the estimated 
mean would lie within two standard errors of our estimate of the mean. That is a lot of 
“estimates,” and it is important to keep this in mind when we look at real data. 
In our earlier example, the students who were retained did better on average than 
those who were promoted. We would like to know how likely it is that we would ob­
tain the same result if we did the experiment over again. Recall that our estimate of the 
average difference is that retained students do two points better than promoted stu­
22. U.S. Census Bureau, “Source and Accuracy of Estimates for Poverty in the United States: 
2001,” appendix to Poverty in the United States: 2001, Current Population Report P60-219 (Wash­
ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002). 
22  Chapter 1 dents. Our estimate of the standard error is four, and the distribution of our estimate 
is approximately normal. Therefore, we estimate that if we repeated the experiment, 
95 percent of the time our estimate would lie between 2 – 1.96 standard errors or 2 – 
1.96 × 4, or about –6, and 2 + 1.96 standard errors, or about 10. This range is called 
the 95 percent confidence interval because we believe (or are confident) that if we re­
peated the exercise, 95 percent of the time we would obtain an estimate in this range. 
To determine the 90 percent confidence interval, we would multiply the standard error 
by 1.64 instead of 1.96. 
We could turn the question on its head by asking what our estimated standard er­
ror would be if the true average difference between the retained and promoted students 
were zero. Suppose that the estimated standard error in this case were also four. We 
would know that if the true difference were zero, 95 percent of the time we would ob­
tain an estimate between –8 and 8. The probability of obtaining an estimate outside 
this range is 5 percent, or .05. 
In practice, it usually makes little difference whether we ask whether two lies out­
side the confidence interval we would have if the true value were zero or whether zero 
lies outside the 95 percent confidence interval based on our estimate of a difference of 
two.23 Because it is usually simpler, we more frequently ask whether zero is outside the 
95 percent confidence interval based on our estimate of two, but we conclude that if 
the true value were zero, it is (un)likely that we would obtain an estimate of two. 
10.7. Statistical Significance.  In statistical jargon, we say that the difference be­
tween our estimate and some value is statistically significant if the value lies outside the 
95 percent confidence interval. Because the probability of something outside the 95 
percent confidence interval is 5 percent, we will say that the difference is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent or .05 level. We may also decide to use a different confi­
dence interval, 90 percent or 99 percent, in which case we will say that the difference 
between our estimate and the value is significant at the .1 or the .01 level. If some value 
falls within the confidence interval of our estimate, we will say that the difference be­
tween our estimate and that value is statistically insignificant. Whether our estimate is 
statistically significantly or insignificantly different from a value depends on the level of 
significance that we choose. The difference may be statistically significant at the .1 level 
but insignificant at the .05 level (but, of course, not the reverse). In the earlier example, 
our estimate of a two-point difference is statistically insignificant whether we choose 
the .05 or the .1 level. 
It is important to recognize that statistical significance does not mean statistical im­
portance. It is unfortunate that statisticians adopted the word “significant.” Suppose 
we had a very large sample of wages of men and women and we estimated that, relative 
to men, women on average earned five dollars less per year. If the standard error of this 
23. The rationale for this is as follows. If the true difference is zero, our estimated difference 
will be close to zero and the estimated standard error will be very similar. If the estimate is very dif­
ferent from zero, the estimated standard error may be quite different, but because the estimate is a long 
way from zero, in either case, the estimate and zero will fall outside each other’s confidence interval. 
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cent confidence interval of one to nine, and the difference would be statistically signif­
icant but probably of no social significance whatsoever. On the other hand, with a small 
sample, a large estimated difference may not be statistically significant. In this case, if 
correct, the difference might be socially important, but because of the small sample, 
we have little confidence in the precision of our estimate. The true difference might be 
much larger, or there might be no difference whatsoever. 
Statistics texts used to say that before performing a test, a researcher should choose 
the significance level and then report whether the effect being studied was statistically 
significant at that level. This approach is problematic. First, if one researcher chose a 
significance level of .1 and another a significance level of .05, they could conduct iden­
tical experiments and draw different conclusions. In addition, the reader had no way 
of verifying that the researcher chose the significance level before learning the results 
and often suspected that the significance level was chosen ex post facto on the basis 
that best suited the researcher. 
Moreover, recall that we do not usually know the standard error and must estimate 
it. Therefore, we only have an estimate of how improbable an estimate is. Perhaps most 
important, our goal is to ask a question like “Do poverty rates differ between blacks 
and whites?” Our answer takes the form of a probability based on the data: “If there 
were no difference in the poverty rates of blacks and whites, the probability of finding 
a difference this large would be less than [a given number].” Our conclusion about 
whether blacks and whites have different poverty rates should not differ substantially if 
that number is 5.0001 percent or 4.9999 percent. Therefore, it is best to think about 
the significance level of a difference and not focus too much on whether it is above or 
below some critical value. 
10.8. The t-Statistic.  If we ask whether some value lies within the x percent confi­
dence interval for our estimate, we are asking whether 
estimate + t* × standard error > value 
and

value > estimate – t* × standard error,

where t* is the value that determines the size of the confidence interval. If we were 
interested in the 95 percent confidence interval, t* would be 1.96. For the 90 percent 
confidence interval, it would be 1.64. 
A little algebra shows that asking whether the value is in the confidence interval is 
the same as asking whether 
absolute value  estimate – value —————— < t*. ( standard error ) 
Thus, if we want to know whether our two-point difference lies within the 95 percent 
confidence interval, we divide it by the estimated standard error (four): 
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standard error  4 
Because .5 is less than 1.96, two lies inside the 95 percent confidence interval, and our 
estimate of two is not significantly different from zero at the .05 level. Indeed, it is not 
significant at the .1 level. 
Note that in order to determine whether the difference is significant, all we have to 
do is divide the difference by the standard error. This ratio is called the t-statistic. We 
then compare the absolute value of the t-statistic to our chosen critical value, or we can 
report the significance level of the t-statistic based on statistical tables. For most pur­
poses, it is sufficient to remember that the probability of a t-statistic greater in abso­
lute value than 1.64 is about .1 and the probability of a t-statistic greater in absolute 
value than 1.96 is about .05 and that the probability declines rapidly as the abso­
lute value of the t-statistic exceeds two. 
Often, as in our example, we are interested in whether some estimate equals zero. 
Is the difference in earnings between men and women statistically significantly differ­
ent from zero? In this case, our t-statistic becomes 
estimate t-statistic =  —————— . ( standard error )
We have noted that our tables will frequently present an estimate with its standard 
error in parentheses underneath. This allows us to calculate the t-statistic quickly. 
Some authors use the same format but report the t-statistic instead of the standard 
error in parentheses. Be careful to check which convention is used when reading dif­
ferent sources. 
10.9. Relations among Variables.  Often we are interested in questions that relate 
one variable to another. We implicitly ask such questions when we ask about differences 
among groups, such as “Is the poverty rate higher for blacks than for whites?” But we 
may be interested in questions like “How does the poverty rate vary with the state of 
the economy?” 
We might observe the poverty rate and the unemployment rate (a measure of the 
state of the economy) over a period of years. We can plot these combinations of poverty 
and unemployment rates on a two-dimensional diagram as in figure 1.1. This gives us 
a good visual sense of whether there is a relation between unemployment and the 
poverty rate, but we still require some way of summarizing the relation. We would like 
to say something like “For each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, 
the poverty rate increases by x percentage points.” To summarize the data, we can fit a 
line to the points. Obviously a straight line will not fit all of the points perfectly, but 
we can choose the line on the basis of how well it fits. Figure 1.1 fits one possible line. 
Statistics courses focus on different techniques for choosing the best line. For this 
book, you will not need to know how to fit a line or the various advantages and dis­
advantages of different techniques. You will need to know how to read a table showing 
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Figure 1.1  Relation between Poverty Rate and Unemployment Rate 
the results of the line-fitting exercise. You will also need to remember that it is the an­
alyst, not the data, who argues the direction of causality. 
The results of the line-fitting in figure 1.1 can be summarized in a table that de­
scribes the line we have fitted. Table 1.1 is presented in a way similar to the estimates 
we presented above. The first column in the table (the one headed “Without Median 
Male Earnings”) says that the poverty rate increases by about .39 percentage points for 
every one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. 
The coefficient, .39, is only an estimate of the relation between the unemployment 
rate and the poverty rate. It is based on a sample of years. If we had chosen different 
years, we might have obtained different answers. 
Recall that we will be much more confident of the precision of our estimate of the 
difference in test scores if they are clustered around the same value than if they vary 
substantially. Similarly, we will be more confident of the precision of our coefficient es­
timate if the points are clustered around our fitted line. 
As with the mean, we summarize the precision of our coefficient estimate by the 
standard error. If the coefficient estimate is normally distributed (and theory shows 
that it generally will be), if we looked at a different 1967 through 2000, 95 percent of 
the time we would obtain an estimate within 1.96 standard errors of .39. 
In our example, the standard error is about .12. The 95 percent confidence inter­
val therefore runs from about .39 – 1.96 × .12, or about .15, to .39 + 1.96 × .12, or 
about .63. We can divide the coefficient by the standard error to obtain a t-statistic of 
about three. It is very unlikely that if the true coefficient were zero we would have ob­
tained a t-statistic this large in absolute value by chance. We are therefore reasonably 
confident that the relation is not due to random sampling error. 
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Without Median Male Earnings  With Median Male Earnings 
Unemployment Rate  0.39  0.15 
(0.12)  (0.12) 
Median Male Earnings  —  –0.47 
(thousands of dollars)  (0.12) 
Constant  10.65  26.17 
(0.73)  (4.10) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
It is important to remember that finding that a relation is unlikely to be the result 
of random sampling does not establish that it is causal. As discussed in the introduc­
tion to this book, we have merely established that the poverty rate and the unemploy­
ment rate have tended to change in the same direction. The poverty rate could be 
changing the unemployment rate, or both rates could be influenced by some other 
factor. 
10.10. Controlling for Other Factors.  In our fictional example earlier in this ap­
pendix, we assumed that we were able to match students on the basis of their sex, age, 
race, family structure, school, and sixth-grade ITBS math and reading scores. In prac­
tice, we are unable to match people exactly. We need techniques that allow us to ask an 
“if” question such as “What would the effect of promotion be if two individuals were 
identical in all these dimensions?” 
If we think that some other factor might account for the relation between the un­
employment rate and the poverty rate, we want to ask, “What would be the effect on 
the poverty rate of an increase in the unemployment rate if this other factor did not 
change?” For example, there is some evidence that wages fluctuate over the business 
cycle, so periods of high unemployment might also be periods of low wages.24 Are the 
changes in the poverty rate driven by changes in the unemployment rate, prevailing 
wages, or both? 
Conceptually, to answer this question we would like to compare periods with dif­
fering unemployment rates in which prevailing wages were constant and also to compare 
the poverty rates in periods with differing prevailing wages but similar unemployment 
rates. Of course, such perfect correspondence may not occur in the data. However, 
statistical techniques allow us to do something comparable. 
The right-hand column of table 1.1 shows the results of one such technique. Each 
coefficient should be interpreted as the effect on the poverty rate of varying that factor 
24. Gary Solon, Robert Barsky, and Jonathan A. Parker, “Measuring the Cyclicality of Real Wages: 
How Important Is Composition Bias?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (February 1994): 1–25. 
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male earnings constant, a one-point increase in the unemployment rate raises the 
poverty rate by about .15 percentage points. The standard error of this estimate is .12, 
which gives a t-statistic of 
.15 —– = 1.25,
.12 
well below 1.96 or even 1.64. Obtaining a t-statistic of this magnitude is quite likely 
even if the true effect of the unemployment rate on the poverty rate is zero. We there­
fore do not have any good evidence that the unemployment rate affects the poverty 
rate. 
On the other hand, even holding the unemployment rate constant, increases in 
median male earnings are associated with quite noticeable reductions in the poverty 
rate. If we were to compare two periods with the same unemployment rate in one of 
which median male earnings exceeded those in the other period by $1,000, we would 
expect that, on average, the period with the higher earnings would have a poverty rate 
about .5 percentage points lower than the period with the lower earnings. 
The standard error of this estimate is also .12, so the t-statistic is close to four. It is 
very unlikely that we would observe a t-statistic of this magnitude if there were no real 
relation between median male earnings and the poverty rate. 
Of course, the relation between median male earnings and the poverty rate, condi­
tional on the unemployment rate, may still be due to some other factor. We address 
this issue in greater depth elsewhere in this book. 
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